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CONSERVING THE NATION'S HERITAGE USING
THE UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT
ELLEN EDGE KATZ
Our third century as a nation has begun, and an ever-growing interest
exists in preserving historic resources.' Preservation is accomplished with an
aggregation of techniques employed to conserve buildings, neighborhoods or
areas which possess historic, cultural or architectural significance. 2 While
government activity is widespread,' political pressures and economic realities
1. See Stipe, Why Preserve?, PRESERVATION NEWS, July, 1972, at 5, col. 2, reprinted in
I1 N.C. CENT. L. J. 211 (1980). More than a decade ago, Professor Robert E. Stipe set forth
several reasons to conserve historically significant resources. Id. Stipe wrote that we
seek to preserve because our historic resources are all that physically link us to our
past.
... [W]e save our physical heritage partly because we live in an age of frightening
communication and other technological abilities, as well as in an era of increasing
cultural homogeneity.
*.. [W]e preserve historic sites and structures because of their relation to past
events, eras, movements and persons that we feel are important to honor and
understand.
.* . [W]e seek to preserve the architecture and landscapes of the past simply
because of their intrinsic value as art.
.* . [W]e seek to preserve our past because we believe in the right of our cities
and countryside to be beautiful.
... [W]e seek to preserve because we have discovered-all too belatedly-that
preservation can serve an important human and social purpose in our society.
Id. at 211-12. See also NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, PRESERVATION: TOWARD
AN ETHIC FOR THE 1980's (1980); Biddle, Historic Preservation: The Citizens' Quiet Revolution,
8 CONN. L. REV. 202 (1976); Gilbert, An Overview of the Law of Historic Preservation, 12
URB. LAW. 13 (1980); Hershman, Critical Legal Issues in Historic Preservation, 12 URE. LAW.
19 (1980); Stipe, A Decade of Preservation and Preservation Law, 11 N.C. CENT. L. J. 214
(1980).
2. See READINGS IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION-WHY? WHAT? How? (N. Williams, E.
Kellogg & F. Gilbert, eds. 1983) (comprehensive discussion of historic preservation).
3. See United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co., 160 U.S.-668, 681 (1896). All
of the four great powers commonly ascribed to government, i.e., war, eminent domain, police
and tax, have been associated with historic preservation. Id. The least commonly used, the war
power, and the power of eminent domain were the justifications for federal condemnation of
private property which was the site of the Civil War battle at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Id.
State government inherently possesses police power which allows appropriate action to
be taken in order to protect the general citizenry. This collective nature of the police power
means individual rights necessarily are circumscribed. So, exercise of the police power is not
without limitation. To be upheld, exercise of the police power must be reasonable in that it
must bear a rational relation to the achievement of a public good. Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
Otherwise, it is not mere regulation but an impermissible taking of a property interest.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). State constitutions vest law making
authority in legislative bodies. Via the police power, a legislature is thus empowered to enact
statutes consistent with the protection of the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.
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limit its significance. The result is an increased number of private, non-
governmental initiatives. These efforts often involve a land owner entering
into an agreement to limit and control a property's future development in
order to assure continued historic significance. 4 Although such arrangements
appear relatively simple, certain obsolete, yet still recognized, common law
property doctrines impede the effectiveness of private agreements to control
future development.' If private preservation agreements are to flourish, these
hindrances must be eliminated.
Early preservation projects often relied on government initiative6 rather
than private agreements. Outright acquisitions of historic properties predom-
inated. However, shifting political climates as well as the expense involved
In addition to state-wide legislation, in recognition of the peculiarly local nature of many zoning
issues, municipalities are delegated zoning authority through enabling statutes in every state.
See 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.19 (2d ed. 1976). Litigation concerning
historic preservation zoning generally involves questions of the degree of public good or the
reasonableness of the ordinances. See generally 2 ANDERSON, supra, at § 9.70 (2d ed. 1976 &
Supp. 1982). At least forty jurisdictions authorize some type of historic district zoning. Beckwith,
Preservation Law 1976-1980: Faction, Property Rights, and Ideology, II N.C. CENT. L. J. 276,
308-40 App. (1980).
The taxing power is also used to promote historic preservation. See Gold, The Welfare
Economics of Historic Preservation 8 CONN. L. REV. 348 (1976) (economic analysis of
government involvement in historic preservation). For current discussions of federal income tax
policy, see NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, TAX INCENTIVES FOR HISTORIC
PRESERVATION (rev. ed. 1981); Coughlin, Increased Tax Penalties for Valuation Overstatements,
2 PRESERVATION L. REP. 2034 (1983) [hereinafter Coughlin (1983)]; Coughlin, Preservation
Easements: Statutory and Tax Planning Issues, I PRESERVATION L. REP. 2011 (1982) [hereinafter
Coughlin (1982)]; Kliman, The Use of Conservation Restrictions on Historic Properties as
Charitable Donations for Federal Income Tax Purposes, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 513
(1981). State and local tax issues are reviewed in D. LISTOKIN, LANDMARKS PRESERVATION AND
THE PROPERTY TAX (1982); Powers, Tax Incentives for Historic Preservation, 12 URB. LAW.
103 (1980); Shull, The Use of Tax Incentives for Historic Preservation 8 CONN. L. REV. 334
(1976).
4. Numerous commentators have discussed private preservation agreements. See generally
R. BRENNEMAN, SHOULD EASEMENTS BE USED TO PROTECT NATIONAL HISTORIC LANDMARKS?
(1975); T. COUGHLIN, EASEMENTS AND OTHER TECHNIQUES TO PROTECT HISTORIC HOUSES IN
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP (1981); N. ROBINSON, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW (1979); Brenneman,
Historic Preservation Restrictions: A Sampling of State Statutes, 8 CONN. L. REV. 231 (1976);
Freeman, The Use of Easements for Historic Preservation, in LEGAL TECHNIQUES IN HISTORIC
PRESERVATION 28 (1972); Lord, The Advantages of Facade Easements, in LEGAL TECHNIQUES
IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION 33 (1972); Netherton, Restrictive Agreements for Historic Preserva-
tion, 12 URB. LAW 54 (1980) [hereinafter Netherton (1980)]; Netherton, Environmental Conser-
vation and Historic Preservation Through Recorded Land-Use Agreements, 14 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 540 (1979) [hereinafter Netherton (1979)]; Rosenberg & Jaconstein, Historic
Preservation Easements: A Proposal for Ohio, 7 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313 (1982); Stipe,
Easements vs. Zoning: Preservation Tools, 20 HISTOIC PRESERVATION 78 (1968).
5. See infra notes 31-65 and accompanying text.
6. See Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation of Historic
Property, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 708 (1963). For example, preservation efforts in the mid-nineteenth
century included New York's acquisition of Hasbrouck House which served as General Wash-
ington's headquarters in Newburgh, New York. Id. An early example of non-governmental
preservation was the formation of a private organization in order to purchase and protect
[Vol. 43:369
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render dependence on government unwise.7 Government inherently is a
political body, and reliance solely upon an institution noted for the emphem-
eral quality of its decisions is naive. As one preservationist has remarked,
supplemental private agreements "are essential in implementing an historic
district. When politicians change the district zoning, you can fall back on
the easements.""
An additional barrier to governmental preservation efforts arises because
governmental entities operate within discrete borders and have restrictions
on the scope of their power. Jurisdictional limits do not necessarily coincide
with historic or aesthetic considerations. Geographic boundaries inherently
discourage broad-scaled efforts since one governmental unit may choose to
preserve a portion of a section while deterioration persists in the adjacent
community. Even within a single jurisdiction constraints on the exercise of
power exist. For instance, state enabling legislation which delegates zoning
authority to local government predominately concentrates on controlling
property usage. 9 Earlier, some had questioned whether this delegation of the
Mount Vernon. Id. See also Freeman, supra note 4, at 28; READINGS IN HISTORIC PRESERVA-
TION-WHY? WHAT? How?, supra note 2, at 34-53 (discussing additional early preservation
efforts).
7. See A. DUNHAM, PRESERVATION OF OPEN SPACE AREAS 91 app. B. (1966). An
interesting example of the impact of political influence is revealed in discussion of the struggle
of A. Montgomery Ward in Chicago to maintain as open space the Lake Michigan frontage
occupied by Grant Park. Id. See also Stipe, supra note 4, at 81.
8. Statement of Mrs. S. Henry Edmunds, Director, Historic Charleston Foundation,
reprinted in I R. BRENNEMAN, supra note 4, at 34. In a recent example of this phenomenon,
the historic zoning in Upland, Pennsylvania was repealed. Pa. Borough Repeals Historic District
Law, PRESERVATION NEWS, Nov. 1982, at 10, col. 3.
9. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65850 (West Supp. 1986). California's delegation of
zoning authority provides:The legislative body of any county or city may, pursuant to this
chapter, adopt ordinances that do any of the following:
(a) Regulate the use of buildings, structures and land as between industry,
business, residences, open space, including agriculture, recreation, enjoyment
of scenic beauty, use of natural resources, and other purposes.
(b) Regulate signs and billboards.
(c) Regulate all of the following:
(I) The location, height, bulk, number of stories and size of buildings
and structures.
(2) The size and use of lots, yards, courts and other open spaces.
(3) The percentage of a lot which may be occupied by a building or
structure.
(4) The intensity of land use.
(d) Establish requirements for off-street parking and loading.
(e) Establish and maintain building setback lines.
(f) Create civic districts around civic centers, public parks, public buildings or
public grounds and establish regulations for those civic districts.
Id. See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 10105 (Purdon Supp. 1983). Pennsylvania's enabling
statute provides:
It is the intent, purpose and scope of this act to protect and promote safety, health
and morals; to accomplish a coordinated development of municipalities... to provide
for the general welfare by guiding and protecting amenity, convenience, future
19861
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police power included aesthetics and, thus, could be used to support historic
concerns.' 0 The Supreme Court's decision in Penn Central Transportation
Company v. New York City," however, removed any doubts. The police
power can be exercised to promote aesthetic considerations. 12 Still, applica-
tion of this power to particular situations may be contested. The designation
of a single building as an historic landmark 3 leads to charges of impermissible
governmental, economic, practical, and social and cultural facilities, development and
growth, as well as the improvement of governmental processes and functions; to
guide uses of land and structures, type and location of streets, public grounds and
other facilities; to promote the conservation of energy through the use of planning
practices and to promote the effective utilization of renewable energy sources; and to
permit municipalities ... to minimize such problems as may presently exist or which
may be foreseen.
Id.
10. See City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964). In
City of Santa Fe, a property owner unsuccessfully argued that the phrase "general welfare" as
used in the state zoning enabling act did not encompass regulation of the size and shape of
window panes on buildings within the Old Santa Fe Historic District. Id. at 17. See generally
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (aesthetic considerations alone
provide sufficient basis to regulate billboards, however, because of differing treatment of non-
commercial and commercial signs, ordinance violated first amendment); I A. RATHKOPF, The
Law of Zoning and Planning, § 14 (4th ed. 1983); Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder:
A New Majority of Jurisdictions Authorize Aesthetic Regulations, 48 UMKC L. REV. 125
(1980); Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation Under the Police Power: The New General Welfare and
the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 VAND. L. REv. 603 (1981); Comment, The Reasona-
bleness of Aesthetic Zoning in Florida: A Look Beyond the Police Power, 10 FLA. ST. L. REv.
441 (1982); Bibliography to Legal Periodicals Dealing With Historic Preservation and Aesthetic
Regulation, 11 N.C. CENT. L. J. 384 (1980); Bibliography to Legal Periodicals Dealing With
Historic Preservation and Aesthetic Regulation, 12 W~AKE FOREST L. REV. 275 (1976).
11. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
12. Id. at 129. In Penn Central, Grand Central Terminal in New York City had been
designated a landmark by the Landmark Preservation Commission. Id. at 115. The Commission
refused to approve plans to construct a fifty story office building above the terminal. Id. at
116-17. In upholding the exercise of the police power in this manner, Justice Brennan commented
that ". . . States and cities may enact land-use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality
of life by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of a city ... ." Id. at 129.
In fact, the plaintiff had not challenged the consideration of aesthetics as a permissible
governmental goal. Id. Instead, the property owner argued unsuccessfully that it was entitled
to compensation due to a "taking" of its property. Id.
The "taking" issue remains significant due to the Court's decisions in San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) and Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255 (1980). These cases and the theory of inverse condemnation have generated much commen-
tary. See, e.g., Bonderman, Comment on "San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego," 33 LAND USE L. & ZONING DiG. May, 1981, at 10, 11; Cunningham, Inverse
Condemnation as a Remedy for "Regulatory Takings," 8 HAsTINGs CONST. L. Q. 517 (1981);
Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGs CONST. L. Q. 491 (1981);
Note, Filling in the Pennsylvania Coal Mine: "Agins v. City of Tiburon and Supreme Court
Approval of Open Space Zoning," 1981 Wisc. L. REv. 790.
13. The designation of the Villard Houses in New York City and the creative plan for
their development is discussed in Marcus, Villard Preserv'd: Or, Zoning for Landmarks in the
Central Business District, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1978).
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spot zoning14 because of differential treatment. To the judiciary, the charge
may be unpersuasive if the selection is part of a comprehensive land use
program." Regardless, the mere allegation may chill local politicians who
are fearful of disputes. Governmental undependability and limitations on
zoning authority are impediments to implementing historic preservation.
Economic pressures compound the issue. Government acquisition of
property is quite costly. Large tax revenues required for purchase and
maintenance result in practical spending limitations. Additionally, both
government and charitable ownership remove property from the tax rolls,
6
further reducing the political popularity of preservation efforts. The search
for less expensive alternatives is prudent especially since public or charitable
ownership often leads to conversion to a museum, representing a financial
burden that often has limited practicality.
7
Many jurisdictions have enacted legislation which authorizes the designation of historic
landmarks. E.g., California, Cal. Gov't Code § 25373 (Deering 1974); District of Columbia,
D.C. Code Ann. §§ 5-1001 to -1006 (1981); Idaho, Idaho Code § 67-4614 to 4616 (1980);
Illinois, Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 24, §§ 11-48.2-2, -5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); Louisiana, La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 25:751 to 767 (West 1975 & Supp. 1983); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 471.193
(West 1977); Mississippi, Miss. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-1 to -5 (Supp. 1982); New York, N.Y. Gen.
Mun. Law § 96-a (McKinney 1977); N.Y. Town Law § 64 (17-a) (McKinney 1973), N.Y. Village
Law § 7-700 (McKinney 1973); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 160A-399.1 to -.399.13
(1982); Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 713.02 (Page 1976); South Dakota, S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. §§ 1-19B-20 to -31 (1980); West Virginia, W. Va. Code § 8-26A (1976).
14. Spot zoning has been defined as "the process of singling out a small parcel of land
for a use classification totally different from that of the surrounding area ..... " I R. ANDERSON,
supra note 3, at § 5.08, citing, Burkett v. Texarkana, 500 S.W.2d (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). It
is impermissible because it differentially classifies a small parcel in a manner inconsistent with
the comprehensive plan and is, therefore, arbitrary and discriminatory.
15. In rejecting the spot zoning argument in Penn Central, the Court wrote that
landmark laws are not like discriminatory, or "reverse spot," zoning: that is, a land-
use decision which arbitrarily singles out a particular parcel for different, less favorable
treatment than the neighboring ones. In contrast to discriminatory zoning, which is
the antithesis of land-use control as part of some comprehensive plan, the New York
City law embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic or aesthetic
interest wherever they might be found in the city, and as noted, over 400 landmarks
and 31 historic districts have been designated pursuant to this plan.
Penn. Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978).
16. See Freeman, supra note 4; Lord, supra note 4, at 33.
17. See READINGS IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION-WHY? WHAT? How?, supra note 2 at 233;
T. COUGHLIN, supra note 4, at 2; Wilson & Winkler, The Response of State Legislation to
Historic Preservation, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 329, 339 (1971) (all expressing reservations
about viability of general policy which encourages conversion of numerous historic properties
to museums).
Museums and museum towns like Williamsburg, Virginia, are not, except in
unusual cases, a desirable way to carry out preservation. Such arrangements are
expensive, and create an artificial atmosphere. At best, they can only preserve a small
part of the building stock which needs preservation.
READINGS IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION-WHY? WHAT? How?, supra note 2, at 233.
For all but the most exceptional properties, continued ownership by concerned
individuals or private organizations is essential to their preservation. Only the most
1986]
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These political and economic constraints on government action motivate
preservationists to continue to search for innovative techniques. With in-
creased private interest in investment,' some commentators stress that his-
toric preservation can be encouraged through adaptive reuse of older
buildings.' 9 This technique requires maintenance of significant original qual-
ities while permitting newer, alternative uses of the structure. Using this
principle, one type of private sector initiative involves utilizing voluntary
private agreements such as easements. Coercive and expensive20 governmental
power is, therefore, unnecessary. Moreover, a private right of redress exists
if the agreement is broken. As one writer emphasized, "[tihis binding,
contractual, partial ownership justifies and necessarily leads to a more
personal and direct enforcement program." 2'
The prospect of harnessing private initiative through individual agree-
ment thus is encouraging. It neither robs the land of its economic benefit
nor allows destruction of its aesthetic quality. Yet, barriers to implementation
of private preservation efforts exist because of certain constraints on the
creation of easements. This article considers supplemental private preserva-
tion techniques, focusing on the Uniform Conservation Easement Act
22
(UCEA) as a useful tool for simplifying private initiatives. The article presents
the UCEA as an aid to historic preservation allowing voluntary, private
significant properties, fully and accurately furnished, and amply endowed to defray
projected costs for maintenance, capital improvements, collections management and
staffing can be considered for museum use.
T. Coughlin, supra note 4, at 2.
18. For a discussion of revolving funds, an alternative method for financing historic
preservation, see A. ZIEGLER, L. ADLER & W. KIDNEY, REVOLVING FUNDS FOR HISTORIC
PRESERVATION: A MANUAL OF PRACTICE (1975); Howard, Revolving Funds: In the Vanguard of
the Preservation Movement, 11 N.C. CENT. L. J. 256 (1980); Revolving Fund Uses Federal
Preservation Dollars, PRESERVATION NEWS, May 1976, at 7, col. 1.
19. Adaptive reuse is an increasingly popular device and has been discussed extensively.
See generally, READINGS IN HIsToRIc PRESERVATION-WHY? WHAT? How?, supra note 2, at
233-272; A. ZIEGLER, HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN INNER CITY AREAS (1974); Tondro, An Historic
Preservation Approach to Municipal Rehabilitation of Older Neighborhoods, 8 CONN. L. REV.
248 (1976); Ziegler, Large-Scale Adaptive Use: Preservation Revitalizes Old Buildings-And
New Ones Too, 11 N.C. CENT. L.J. 234 (1980).
20. Acquisition of a partial interest generally is less expensive than outright purchase. The
value of a facade easement has been estimated as ten percent of full value. Lord, supra note 4.
Valuation of partial interests is discussed in T. COUGHLIN, supra note 4, at 8-11.
It has been suggested, however, that purchase of partial interests is not always less
expensive. Government purchases of scenic easements in conjunction with the Blue Ridge
Parkway and Natchez Trace Parkway were perhaps as costly as it would have been to make
outright purchases. National Park Service, Scenic Easements and their Tax Consequences, in
NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, supra note 3, at 147; Coughlin (1983), supra
note 3; Coughlin (1982), supra note 3.
21. Lord, supra note 4.
22. Unif. Conservation Easement Act, 12 U.L.A. 55 (Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as
UCEA]. Several jurisdictions have adopted the UCEA. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1201 to -
1206 (Supp. 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.390 (1983); Ore. Rev. Stat.. §§ 271.715-271.795
(1985); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 700.40 (West Supp. 1982).
[Vol. 43:369
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transfers while minimizing legal complexities. In order to understand the
UCEA, however, it is advantageous first to highlight the myriad uses of
private agreements and extant impediments to their employment.
I. USING PRIVATE PRESERVATION TECHNIQUES
In furtherance of a private preservation program, a land owner typically
agrees to retain historic aspects of a property in exchange for compensation,
tax benefits or other consideration. When a structure remains usable for
modern purposes, the devaluation from the restriction may be minimal.
23
Private agreements for land management are neither new nor unusual;
application to historic preservation is merely a variation of programs designed
to conserve open space first developed in the nineteenth century. 24 As with
conservation, the predominant function for historic preservation is to reduce
development potential where it threatens the historic character of a significant
property. With a private easement plan, the grantor may obtain an economic
remuneration or tax benefit in lieu of traditional development rights.
For instance, a local historic organization may pay the owner to control
a property's future in order to conserve its historic significance. Rather than
transferring full title, an easement is granted, and the easement is limited to
the grantor's duty to maintain the historic aspects of the property. In short,
the owner retains a power to use the property in any manner consistent with
preservation. Thus, instead of expending large sums in outright acquisitions,
less money is required to purchase historic preservation easements. By
agreement, the landowner retains the right to utilize the property for modern
purposes while receiving financial compensation for limiting development to
those uses consistent with the historic easement.
The variety of extant preservation efforts attests to the flexibility of the
concept. Protection of the exterior of a structure in order to maintain
architectural features is most common, 25 but in some instances, the interior
23. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing adaptive reuse).
24. W. VHYTE, SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
II (1959). In his seminal work on conserving open-space, William Whyte traces early use of
conservation easements to the 1890's in Boston, Massachusetts. Id.
25. A typical facade easement is held by the National Trust for Historic Preservation
relating to Reynolds Tavern in Annapolis, Maryland. It provides, in part,
[w]ithout the express written permission of the Grantee signed by its duly authorized
representative, no construction, alteration or remodeling or any other thing shall be
undertaken or permitted to be undertaken on the subject premises which would affect
... the exterior (including, without limitation, the roofs and chimneys) or any
building or other improvement located thereon, . . . provided, however, that the
reconstruction, repair, repainting or refinishing of presently existing parts or elements
of the lot and improvements, damage to which has resulted from casualty loss,
deterioration, or wear and tear, shall be permitted, provided ... [it] would not alter
the appearance of the lot or improvements as they are as of this date .... In all
events, the Grantor, in painting the exterior of any building or improvements on the
premises, agrees to obtain the prior written consent of Grantee. ...
Deed of Easement, reprinted in 3 R. BRENNEMAN, supra note 4, at D-51.
1986]
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is the preservation subject. 26 Land adjacent to historic structures might also
be involved. Piscataway Park, Maryland, includes easements on 1,215 acres
and is designed to enhance and protect the view from Mt. Vernon on the
adjacent Virginia shore.27 Another example is in Louisa County, Virginia,
where the rural atmosphere is protected by easements covering 7,000 acres. 2
An interesting adaptation of this approach found in New York City and
other locations allows sale of development rights represented in the vacant
air space above low-rise buildings.29 This innovation has come about through
cooperation between government and the private sector. In order to preserve
the character of an area which could be lost with new high rise structures,
local government allows the transfer of development rights. It designates
receiving areas where increased density and height are allowed and permits
those property owners to purchase a construction power from owners in the
low-rise district. Accordingly, new construction is limited in a low-rise area
while property owners realize the economic value that would have attended
high-rise development.
Clearly, the hallmark of any successful preservation program is innova-
tion through artistic and managerial creativity. To require in all settings only
the choices of museum status or foregoing preservation is unnecessary and
unwise. Nevertheless, under many existing statutes these are the only available
options because of the confluence of limited preservation funds and archaic
legal doctrine. An active private easement program presents a viable solution
because less money is required and more properties may be preserved.
Because funding requirements are lower, more and smaller groups of pres-
ervationists may become active. Yet, many jurisdictions inhibit the use of
easements.30 Unless traditional legal concepts are carefully adapted to meet
current problems, historic resources are imperiled. These doctrinal impedi-
ments and modern modifications including the UCEA will be reviewed.
26. See id. at D-50. The alteration limitation on a three hundred year old building in
Ipswitch, Massachusetts, stipulates that permission must be obtained to alter:
[t]he central frame including primary and secondary members; the feather edged
paneling in the first floor right front room of the original 1690 building; the wooden
architectural elements including if any, paneling, mantlepieces, doors and other
molded detail on the inner walls of the two second story bedrooms of the original
1690 dwelling.
Id. at D-50.
27. 1 R. BRENNEMAN, supra note 4, at 37; 3 R. BRENNEMAN, supra note 4, at D-31 (setting
forth specific restrictions encumbering Piscataway Park).
28. See Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839 (1980) (discussing
Louisa County, Va., easement program).
29. See Penn Central Transportation v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1978)
(discussing transferable development rights). See also Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive
Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARv. L. REv. 574 (1972); Marcus, Air
Rights Transfers in New York City, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 372.
30. See infra notes 36-65 and accompanying text (discussing traditional doctrinal limita-
tions on real covenants, equitable servitudes, and easements).
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II. ComoN LAW REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITATIONS
In order to defray the enormous acquisition and maintenance costs
required for museums, innovative preservationists seek less expensive meth-
ods. Adaptive reuse with control over significant design features is ideal if
an enforceable, long-term program is possible. A similar problem with
acquiring open space can be solved where compatible uses such as farming
are maintained. Private agreements to meet these goals potentially could be
implemented through common law property concepts such as real covenants
and easements. Traditional burdens limit the usefulness of these doctrines,
however.
In pre-industrial England, land was the major incident of wealth and its
transferability was an important aspect of early commerce."3 Practices which
hampered the marketability of land were discouraged. Since easements and
real covenants are held by third parties, and at that time, there was no land
title registry, 2 their existence was difficult to ascertain. Characterized by one
judge as "novel incidents,"" a creation of covenants and easements was
severely limited by impediments designed to curtail any long term effect.
3 4
Although every state has some form of land registration system, 35 develop-
ment of these common law limitations concerning covenants and easements
is significant since many tenets have survived. Adaptation of the concepts of
covenants and easements is important to preservationists because under these
arrangements, private ownership of the fee interest continues, and, at the
same time, historic aspects are protected. Unless agreements such as cove-
nants and easements can bind subsequent owners, the only remaining alter-
native is expensive outright purchase of historic property.
A. Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes
A covenant is a promise which may give rise to a contractual obligation.36
If the agreement pertains to the use of land and certain requirements are
31. See generally J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 120 (1971).
32. See D. HAYTON, REGISTERED LAND (2d ed. 1977); C. KOLBERT & N. MACKAY, HISTORY
OF SCOTS AND ENGLISH LAND LAW 279-95 (1977) (discussing history of English land registration).
33. See Keppell v. Bailey, 2 Myl. & K. 517, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch. 1834). Speaking
against non-possessory interests, one English judge said, "it must not be supposed that incidents
of a novel kind can be devised and attached to property at the fancy or caprice of any owner."
Id.
34. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.14 (A. Casner ed. 1952); Browder,
Running Covenants and Public Policy, 77 MICH. L. REV. 12, 14-19 (1978); Netherton (1979),
supra note 4, at 543-45. Modern concern about marketability is reflected in the RESTATEMENT
OF PROPERTY. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 537 comment (a), 543 comment (a) (1944)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
35. R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, REAL ESTATE LAW 83 (8th ed. 1983); G. PINDAR,
AMERICAN REAL ESTATE LAW § 19-114 (1976).
36. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 34, at § 9.8; 7 G. THOMPSON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 3150 (1962).
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fulfilled, it also may affect successive property owners. This is a crucial
factor for historic preservation because the primary purpose is long range
protection. In order for a real covenant to run with the land 7 and bind
subsequent owners, several elements are indispensable: a written agreement a"
evidencing an intention that the real covenant shall run to subsequent owners
must exist, 39 the covenant must touch and concern the land, 40 and privity of
estate is required. 41 Unless each element is present, traditionally enforcement
is refused.
42
37. Covenants which run with the land and, therefore, bind successive owners are to be
differentiated from personal covenants which bind only the original parties to the agreement. 7
G. THOMP, SON, supra note 36, at § 3151. One example of a personal covenant is a clause
requiring a mortgagor to insure premises for the benefit of the mortgagee. Tremont Savings &
Loan Assn. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 41 A.D.2d 633, 340 NYS2d 732 (1973). See
generally C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH RUN WITH THE LAND (2d
ed. 1947).
38. A real covenant does not create an interest in land in the way an easement does. 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 34, at § 9.8. However, for purposes of the Statute of
Frauds, the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY and many jurisdictions treat a real covenant as an
interest which must be in writing. See generally 5 R. Powell & P. Rohan, POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY 671 NN.9, 10 (1981); Restatement, supra note 34, at § 522. For example, an oral
promise was held unenforceable as a real covenant in City of Tucson v. Superior Court of Pima
County, 116 Ariz. App. 322, 569 P.2d 264, 266 (1977).
39. See, e.g, Brendonwood Common v. Franklin, 403 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (Ind. App.
1980) (explicit deed language showed that parties intended to bind subsequent owners); Huff v.
Duncan, 263 Ore. 408, 502 P.2d 584, 586 (1972) (same); Greenspan v. Rehberg, 56 Mich. App.
310, 224 N.W.2d 67, 73 (1974) (subject of covenant demonstrated intent of parties to bind
subsequent owners). See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 34, at § 9.10; 5
R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 38, at 673[2][a].
40. A covenant involves both a benefit and a burden. The touch and concern requirement
is satisfied where the value of the benefited land is enhanced and the value of the burdened
land is diminished. C. CLARK, supra note 37, at 97. See, e.g., Greenspan v. Rehberg, 56 Mich.
App. 310, 224 N.W.2d 67, 74 (1974) (covenant for road maintenance); Huff v. Duncan, 263
Ore. 408, 502 P.2d 584, 585 (1972) (building restrictions). See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 34, at § 9.13; 5 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 38, at 673[2][A].
41. Privity of estate is a troublesome concept from the historical perspective. The seminal
statement of the requirements for a covenant to run, found in Spencer's Case, 5 Coke 16a, 77
Eng. Rep. 72 (Q.B. 1583), failed to specify the nature of the required privity. Two hundred
years later the dispute was settled by dicta in Webb v. Russel, 100 Eng. Rep. 639 (KB 1789),
which stated there must be privity of estate between the covenantor and covenantee. In transfers
between fee owners, this requirement is satisfied by horizontal or mutual privity. See, e.g.,
Carlson v. Libby, 137 Conn. 362, 77 A.2d 332, 335 (1950); Leighton v. Leonard, 22 Wash.
App. 136, 589 P.2d 279, 281 (1979). For discussion of the conflicting views of privity of estate,
see 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 34, at §§ 9.11, 9.15; C. Clark, supra note 37,
at 116-37; 5 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 38, at 673[2][c]; 7 0. Thompson, supra note
36, at § 3155.
42. Spencer's Case, 5 Coke 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (Q.B. 1583), is the landmark English
case which set forth some of the requirements for enforcement of a real covenant. See 7 0.
THOMPSON, supra note 36, at §§ 3151, 3155. The requirements have been refined into those
presently mandated. 5 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 38, at 67311]. See infra notes 31-34
and accompanying text for a discussion of the historical setting for the development of these
limitations.
[Vol. 43:369
CONSERVING THE NATION'S HERITAGE
A particular complication arises when the covenant is held in gross and
does not pertain to a dominant tenement retained by the owner of the
personal covenant. 43 An example occurs when a preservation group conveys
a property to a third party with a deed containing an agreement to maintain
an historic facade. Since the preservation group retains no real property
benefitted by the facade agreement, it is a covenant in gross, i.e., no
dominant tenement exists. Many courts refuse to enforce such a covenant
against subsequent owners of the burdened land since the benefit in gross
actually does not touch and concern property. This same factor prevents the
assignment of an otherwise valid covenant to a third party such as a
preservation group."4 So, these very typical arrangements fail to meet tradi-
tional requirements necessary to ensure long term enforcement.
Even though real covenants might be useful for historic preservation
where fee ownership is transferred with real covenants either preserving
significant aspects of the property, requiring maintenance, or excluding
incompatible uses, 41 their utility is questionable. Preservationists often lack
sufficient funds to acquire the fee title initially46 and, therefore, are unable
to create the real covenants themselves. In addition, enforcement of a real
covenant is an action at law for which the usual remedy is damages. 47
However, if a covenant protecting an historic facade is breached, the desired
remedy would be an injunction in equity rather than a money judgment.
Due to these limitations, real covenants do not provide a dependable pres-
ervation mechanism.
The unenforceability against successive owners of land bearing a real
covenant that failed to meet technical requirements seemed a harsh result if
43. See C. CLARK, supra note 37, at 4.
The individual who has the right, privilege, or power ... has the benefit; the one
who has the duty, no-right, or liability has the burden. When the benefit is to be
exercised for a particular parcel of land, it is appurtenant to and passes with such
land; when it is personal to a named person, it is said to be in gross.
Id.
44. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 34, at § 9.13 & n.10. See also Netherton
(1979), supra note 4, at 550; RETATEMENT, supra note 34, at §§ 534, 537.
45. In cases not directly related to historic preservation, the following real covenants have
been allowed: Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974) (covenant restricting age
of residents in trailer park); Inhabitants of Middlefield v. Church Mills Knitting Co., 160 Mass.
267, 35 N.E. 780 (1894) (bridge maintenance); Malcolm v. Shamie, 95 Mich. App. 132, 290
N.W.2d 101 (1980) (single-family covenant aimed at exclusion of group residence for mentally
retarded adults); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Willis, 200 Va. 299, 105 S.E.2d 833 (1958)
(fence construction and maintenance).
46. See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
47. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 34, at § 9.8. In some
instances, a court might view the agreement as creating a "property interest in the nature of an
equitable servitude: and grant an injunction. Id. at §§ 9.8, 9.24. See also RESTATEMENT, supra
note 34, at § 528. Or, the agreement may be construed as a contract for which money damages
are an inadequate remedy. 2 AMEICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 34, at § 9.24. Many
American courts adopt the former view when granting such an injunction. Id.; C. CLARK, supra
note 37, at 180.
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the successive owners had advance knowledge of its existence. Courts came
to recognize this unfairness and developed the doctrine of equitable servitudes
in the nineteenth century. 48 Privity was not demanded. Equity courts enforced
these agreements against later owners who actually knew of the limitation
since injustice otherwise would result.49 Because the claim was raised in
equity, an injunction was an appropriate remedy.50 This factor remains
significant for preservation programs.
Still, an important limitation exists since many courts apply the require-
ment that in order to run to subsequent owners of the burdened land, the
benefit must touch and concern land owned by the holder of the benefit.',
A preservation group possessing a benefit in gross fails to meet this test if it
owns no other land so enforcement is unlikely. Equitable servitudes in gross
also are not assignable to third parties. 2 Simply stated, neither real covenants
nor equitable servitudes are consistently useful preservation tools.
B. Easements
An older and more broadly employed concept is the easement which is
a limited property ownership interest in another's land. 3 It guarantees to the
48. Hills v. Miller, 3 Paige 254 (N.Y. Ch. 1832), reportedly is the first American decision
adopting the doctrine of equitable servitudes. In Traficante v. Pope, 115 N.H. 356, 341 A.2d
782 (1975), the Court stated the modern American view of equitable servitudes.
Even though a promise is unenforceable as a covenant at law because of failure to
meet one of the requirements, the promise may be enforced as an equitable servitude
against the promisor or a subsequent taker who acquired the land with notice of the
restrictions on it. The rationale for enforcing promises restricting the use of land as
equitable servitudes is that 'he who takes land with notice of a restriction upon it will
not in equity and good conscience be permitted to act in violation of the terms of
these restrictions.'
Id. at 784 (citations omitted). In England, the doctrine arose in Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phil. 774,
41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848), which is discussed in 5 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 38,
at 67012], 67312][d].
49. Traficante v. Pope, 115 N.H. 356, 341 A.2d 782, 784 (1975); R. BOYER, SURVEY OF
THE LAW OF PROPERTY 540 (3d ed. 1981).
50. The majority of American courts view an equitable servitude as a property interest
which gives the owner rights in rem making available injunctive relief. There is some authority
that the interest is a contract right for which specific performance is available. This is the less
popular view, 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 34, at § 9.24.
51. Id. at § 9.32.
52. Id.
53. The RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY sets forth the following definition.
An easement is an interest in land in the possession of another which
(a) entitles the owner of such interest to a limited use or enjoyment of the land in
which the interest exists;
(b) entitles him to protection as against third persons from interference in such use
or enjoyment;
(c) is not subject to the will of the possessor of the land;
(d) is not a normal incident of the possession of any land possessed by the owner
of the interest, and
(e) is capable of creation by conveyance.
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holder specified rights in the servient property.5 4 Easements are subcatego-
rized on various dimensions. One classification depends upon the effect on
the burdened land. An affirmative easement allows entrance or utilization. 55
For example, rights-of-way permit the holder to cross the servient land.5 6 A
negative easement, by contrast, assures to the holder the right to prevent the
burdened property from being used in specified ways.5 7 Building restrictions
are a common example. s
Another division depends on whether the guaranteed right pertains to a
dominant parcel rather than to the holder personally. If the easement confers
a benefit associated with property owned by the holder, it is an easement
appurtenant.5 9 For example, provisions for ingress and egress over the servient
land enabling the holder to reach the dominant parcel constitute an easement
appurtenant.6 Some easements grant rights in the burdened property but not
in relation to other land owned by the holder. They merely are personal and
are called easements in gross. 6' Representative of this concept are use rights
such as hunting or boating not associated with the holder's property but
only with personal desires. 62 A further delineation of easements in gross
occurs if removal of soil, timber or similar items is permitted. Such an
easement is characterized as in gross with a profit.6 1 Since easements in gross
RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, at § 450. For a slightly different definition, see 7 G. THOMPSON,
supra note 36, at § 3183.
Easements may be created in a written instrument, or by implication, necessity or
prescription. 3 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 38, at §§ 415, 416. This article deals only
with express easements.
54. See, e.g., Etz v. Mamerow, 72 Ariz. 228, 233 P.2d 442 (1951); Clements v. Sannuti,
356 Pa. 63, 51 A.2d 697 (1947).
55. RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, at § 451.
56. E.g., White v. New York & N.E.R. Co., 156 Mass. 181, 30 N.E. 612 (1892) (right-
of-way over railroad bed). See also Shrull v. Rapasardi, 33 Colo. App. 148, 517 P.2d 860 (1973)
(drainage ditch); Putnam v. Dickinson, 142 N.W.2d 1fI (N.D. 1966) (right to use land as a
private park).
57. RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, at § 452.
58. E.g., Ham v. Massasoit Real Estate Co., 41 R.I. 293, 107 A. 205 (1919) (cost and
location of structures); Hennen v. Deveney, 71 W. Va. 629, 77 S.E. 142 (1913) (ten foot wide
strip where all building prohibited). See also Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Lowry, 104
Mont. 289, 66 P.2d 792 (1937) (prohibition of liquor sales).
59. RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, at § 453.
60. E.g., White v. New York & N.E.R. Co., 156 Mass. 181, 30 N.E. 612 (1892) (right of
way over railroad bed to connect two parcels owned by the holder). See also Shrull v. Rapasardi,
33 Colo. App. 148, 517 P.2d 860 (1973) (drainage ditch to benefit holder's property); North-
western Improvement Co. v. Lowry, 104 Mont. 289, 66 P.2d 792 (1937) (prohibition of liquor
sales for benefit of other lands owned by holder).
61. RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, at § 454.
62. E.g., Williams v. Diederich, 359 Mo. 683, 223 S.W.2d 402 (1949). See also Willoughby
v. Lawrence, 116 11. 11, 4 N.E. 356 (1886) (right-of-way in holder not benefiting other land).
Courts do not favor construction of interests in gross; rather, courts construe easements
as appurtenant if possible. Todd v. Nobach, 368 Mich. 544, 118 N.W.2d 402, 405 (1962) ("to
personally have the privilege of ingress and egress" construed to create easement appurtenant).
63. E.g., Stockdale v. Yerden, 220 Mich. 444, 190 N.W. 225 (1922) (removal of timber).
See generally 3 R. POWELL & P. RoHAN, supra note 38, at 405.
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are rights personal to the holder, some older doctrine disallows assignment
and alienation, especially where the easement is not coupled with a profit.6
Easement classification is relevant to historic preservation because tra-
ditional precepts permeate modern practices. Since preservation easement
holders frequently do not own benefitted land, and the purpose of the
easement is to curtail future alteration and development of the burdened
property, most preservation easements are negative, in gross and without a
profit. Due to the negative aspect of preservation easements, the burden
upon the servient estate is more characteristic of an individual duty not to
disturb the land's historic significance. Because the easement is in gross, the
benefit and the right to enforce the easement run only to an individual
organization. Thus, a negative easement in gross without a profit is an
interest held by a third party which can curtail future land development.
Unfortunately, such interests traditionally are not assignable or alienable
6
1
since the older common law viewpoint contends that individual rights remain
personal and cannot be part of the title. Easements must be tied to another
parcel in order to run to subsequent owners, once again requiring ownership
of another piece of land for enforcement.
If historic preservation is to be effective, conservation interests must be
obtainable at the lowest possible cost. Requiring ownership of appurtenant
real property is an expense that unduly strains scarce resources. Since neither
easements, real covenants nor equitable servitudes promote widespread pres-
ervation, some modern statutes attempt to rectify these traditional limitations
and facilitate creation of long term preservation interests. After discussing
these efforts, the article reviews the standardized approach offered by the
UCEA.
III. MODERN MODMICATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW
Shifting land use requirements highlighted common law limitations on
the use of real covenants, equitable servitudes and easements. As society
became more complex and demands upon land resources increased, argu-
ments arose in favor of various modifications of the common law rules.
66
64. See 3 R. POWELL & P. RoHAN, supra note 38, at 405, 419. Commentators have noted
a modern though not universal trend allowing assignability. Id.
65. Id.
66. See R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 38, at 404[2] (CITATION OMIrED).
Over the past several decades, much of the opinion writing in the area of
easements has concerned the topics of interpretation of written instruments; the
number of persons entitled to the benefit of an existing easement (particularly where
the dominant property is later subdivided and intensely developed); prescriptive rights;
obstruction and termination of easements. To this extent, the case law has been
marking time, in that the same topics have been litigated for generations. In the
coming decades, however, substantial legal questions remain to be answered and new
techniques fashioned. The arrival of condominium, and the expanded use of 'air
rights' to salvage valuable space over railroads and other unusable urban sites, will
necessitate further refinements. The coming of age of cluster housing developments,
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Both legislatures and the courts have been involved in implementing these
changes. Of great significance to preservationists is the increasing acceptance
of non-possessory interests in real property.
United States v. Albrecht67 upheld a recorded easement in gross in favor
of the United States for the preservation of waterfowl production areas.
Even though under state law easements in gross were not binding on
successors, the easement was sustained as necessary to effectuate national
public policy. More commonly, statutory modifications have been employed.
For example, a number of state legislatures have eliminated common law
restrictions on interests in gross.6 The first state to do so was Massachusetts,
which adopted the Massachusetts Conservation and Preservation Statute6 9 in
1969. For qualified interests, 70 the statute eliminated both the requirements
with their maximization of open lands, as well as the condemnation of scenic
easements by public authorities, will also prove a fertile source of new approaches.
Esthetic considerations will certainly move to the forefront. Finally, questions
concerning easements by implication and necessity will continue to challenge the
ingenuity of the judiciary, as an attempt is made to achieve sensible land use within
the confines of not overly flexible rules of traditional property law. In summary, it
may be anticipated that the next decade will witness long overdue progress in the field
of easements, perhaps by way of federal, state, and local legislation.
Id. The RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY takes a different view.
The imposition, by virtue of his succession, of an obligation as a promisor upon the
successor of one who has made a promise respecting the use of his land creates a
burden upon the ownership of the land of the promisor which may have a disadvan-
tageous effect upon its use and development. There is a social interest in the utilization
of land. That social interest is adversely affected by burdens placed on the ownership
of land.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, at § 537 comment a (1944).
67. 364 F. Supp. 1349 (D.N.D. 1973), aff'd, 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974).
68. E.g., California, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50281(5) (Deering 1974); Colorado, COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 38-30.5.101 to -110 (1982); Connecticut, CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-42b (West
1978); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7 § 6811 (Supp. 1980); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §
704.06 (West Supp. 1982); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-10-1 to -5 (1982); Illinois, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 24 § 11-48.2-1A(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); Indiana, IND. CODE § 14-4-5.5-1 (Supp.
1981); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 668 (1978); Maryland, MD. REAL PROP. CODE
ANN. § 2-118 (1981); Massachusetts, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 184 § 30 (Michie/Law. Co-op.
1977); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 84.65 (1977); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 76-2-205, 209
& 210(2) (1981); New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 477.46 (Supp. 1979); New York,
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 247(4) (McKinney Supp. 1981); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-
39-3 (Supp. 1982); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-9-10, -20 (1977).
69. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184, §§ 31-33 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1977 & Supp. 1982).
70. See id. at § 31. Massachusetts provides, in part,
[a] preservation restriction means a right, whether or not stated in the form of a
restriction, easement, covenant or condition, in any deed, will or other instrument
executed by or on behalf of the owner of the land or in any order of taking,
appropriate to preservation of a structure or site historically significant for its
architecture, archaeology or associations, to forbid or limit any or all (a) alterations
in exterior or interior features of the structure, (b) changes in appearance or condition
of the site, (c) uses not historically appropriate, (d) field investigation, as defined in
section twenty-six A of chapter nine, without a permit as provided by section twenty-
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of privity of estate and appurtenant land 71 and further allowed assignment
where the assignee meets certain statutory criteria.
72
In some instances, conveyancing and recording procedures also have
been modified. Massachusetts 73 and Montana 74 provide separate sets of
records for conservation and preservation interests which effectively supply
notice to future purchasers. Several states require pertinent documents to be
filed in multiple offices. For instance, Georgia mandates dedication as a
heritage preserve to be filed with the Secretary of State and in the local
clerk's office of the superior court if the property is accepted by the Heritage
Trust program after recommendation of the board and approval of the
Governor. 75 These recording procedures indicate interest in resolving the
notice problems created by easements. While these changes are significant,
multiformity of approach may lead to immense confusion as each state
selects its own unique approach to modify the common law.
seven C of said chapter, or (e) other acts or uses detrimental to appropriate
preservation of the structure or site.
Id. Conservation restrictions and agricultural preservation restrictions are separately defined.
Id.
71. Id. at § 32.
72. Id.
73. Id. at § 33. Massachusetts further provides
[a]ny city or town may file with the register of deeds for the county or district in
which it is situated a map or set of maps of the city or town, to be known as the
public restriction tract index, on which may be indexed conservation, preservation
and agricultural preservation restrictions and restrictions held by any governmental
body. Such indexing shall indicate sufficiently for identification (a) the land subject
to the restriction, (b) the name of the holder of the restriction, and (c) the place of
record in the public records of the instrument imposing the restriction.
Whenever any instrument of acquisition of a restriction or order or other
appropriate evidence entitled to be indexed in a public restriction tract index is
submitted for such indexing, the register shall make, or require the holder of the
right to enforce the restriction or order or interest to make, appropriate additions to
the tract index, and such addition shall, as to any restriction or order or other
appropriate evidence previously recorded entitled to be indexed, be likewise made on
request of the holder of the right to enforce it.
Id.
74. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-207 (1981). Montana provides
(1) [a]ll conservation easements shall be duly recorded in the county where the land
lies so as to effect their titles in the manner of other conveyances of interest in land
and shall describe the land subject to said conservation easement by adequate legal
description or by reference to a recorded plat showing its boundaries.
(2) The county clerk and recorder shall upon recording cause a copy of the
conservation easement to be placed in a separate file within the office of the county
clerk and recorder and shall cause a copy of the conservation easement to be mailed
to the department of revenue.
Id.
75. See GA. CODE ANN. § 12-3-75 (1982). Georgia provides:
[a] heritage area which has been acquired by the Department of Natural Resources
for the Heritage Trust Program may be dedicated as a heritage preserve after written
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IV. THE UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT
In reaction to the traditional limitations and diverse state responses7 6 in
1981, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
drafted the UCEA. 77 Four states, Arkansas,78 Nevada,7 9 Oregon, 0 and
Wisconsin' have adopted the proposal. It was designed to maximize "the
freedom of the creators of the transaction to impose restrictions on the use
of land and improvements in order to protect them, and [to allow] similar
latitude to impose affirmative duties for the same purposes." ' 2 The Act's
requirements are viewed in light of current interest in alternative preservation
techniques.
The UCEA was aimed at fostering the creation and viability of non-
possessory property interests for preservation purposes..As indicated previ-
ously, courts historically looked with disfavor on such property interests.
The passage of time and the industrialization of society brought diversity in
the sources of wealth. No longer was commerce solely dependent on land,
nor did non-possessory interests necessarily hinder marketability. Moreover,
the prevalence of land recording systems alleviated concern about the ability
of prospective purchasers to verify the existence of non-possessory interests. 3
Upon reflection, historic disfavor no longer was justifiable, however, hundreds
,of years of property theory required modification.
recommendation of the board and approval by the Governor. Any other real property
owned by the State of Georgia and under the custody of the department may be
similarly dedicated. The written recommendation shall contain a provision which
designates the best and most important use or uses to which the land is to be put.
The dedication as a heritage preserve shall become effective when the written
recommendation and the approval of the Governor are filed with the office of the
Secretary of State. The written recommendation and the approval of the governor
shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county or counties
in which the heritage preserve is located.
Id. Recordable facade and conservation easements are filed in the office of the clerk of the
superior court of the appropriate county. Id. at § 44-10-5.
In Montana, copies of easements are filed with the county clerk and the Department of
Revenue. MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-207 (1981).
76. See Netherton, supia note 4, at 62-65. Numerous states have adopted statutes which
alter common law doctrines and aid in creating non-possessory interests for conservation and
preservation purposes. Id. A comparison of statues of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Hampshire and Maryland is found in Brenneman, supra note 4.
77. UCEA, supra note 22.
78. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1201 to 1206 (Supp. 1983) (provisions substantially similar to
the UCEA).
79. NEv. REV. STAT. § 111.390-440 (1983) (provisions substantially similar to the UCEA).
80. 1983 Or. Laws vol. 2 ch. 642 (provisions substantially similar to the UCEA).
81. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 700.40 (West Supp. 1982) (provisions substantially similar to the
UCEA).
82. UCEA, supra note 22 (Commissioners' prefatory note).
83. See Netherton, supra note 4, at 59-60. In the United States, land title recording
systems were instituted in the mid-nineteenth century. Sophisticated techniques currently exist
for careful searching of these records. Id.
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Because courts have disfavored non-possessory rights, little law exists to
govern the valid use of these interests. The Commissioners first dealt with
fiVe aspects of the creation of valid conservation easements: definition,
qualified holders, acceptance, duration and modification. Since interests
properly created under the UCEA would be valid, enforcement also is covered
by the UCEA. Finally, the UCEA removes common law impediments to the
use of non-possessory property interests.
A. Creation
The easement 84 concept was selected by the Commissioners as the appro-
priate tool to simplify effectuation of private agreements. In so doing, the
Commissioners rejected adaptation of common law requirements associated
with real covenants and equitable servitudes. 85 Additionally, the Commis-
sioners eliminated the development of a new and distinct property concept.1
6
Several reasons support the choice of the easement concept. A new interest
simply adds additional methodology to property law which already is overly
complex. As the oldest non-possessory interest still in common usage,
easements are well understood, whereas real covenants and equitable servi-
tudes originally developed in response to limitations on easements occasioned
by the lack of a recording system for land ownership.
7
Interest in conservation and preservation must be weighed against the
demands of an administratively feasible program. The Commissioners struck
this balance by imposing requirements for the creation and enforcement of
valid conservation and preservation easements. As defined in the UCEA, the
new easement concept is:
a non-possessory interest of a holder in real property imposing
limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes of which include
retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real
property, assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recrea-
tional, resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water quality, or
preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural
aspects of real property. s8
Several states89 also use this approach characterizing the property interest in
relation to statutorily stated purposes. In this manner, the common law
84. See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
86. See Brenneman, supra note 4, at 247.
87. UCEA, supra note 22 (Commissioners' prefatory note).
88. Id. at § 1().
89. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-39-2 (Supp. 1982). The Rhode Island statute uses this
language:
[a] "preservation restriction" shall mean a right to prohibit or require, a limitation
upon, or an obligation to perform acts on or with respect to or uses of a structure
of site historically significant for its architecture, archaeology or associations, whether
stated in the form of a restriction, easement, covenant condition, in any deed, will
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modifications discussed below are limited to specified situations, and the
validity of other property interests is unaffected.
One important consideration is the determination of qualified grantees.
The traditional reluctance to encourage these agreements produces legislative
restraint in authorizing their modern creation. Holders under the UCEA are
restricted either to a governmental body so empowered or a charitable
institution meeting statutory criteria. 90 This is a common approach used in
or other instrument executed by or on behalf of the owner of the structure or site or
in any order of taking, which right, limitation or obligation is appropriate to the
preservation or restoration of such structure or site.
Id. The statutory definition of conservation easement uses similar language. Id. Other examples
include Colorado,
'[c]onservation easement in gross,' for the purposes of this article, means a right in
the owner of the easement to prohibit or require a limitation upon or an obligation
to perform acts on or with respect to a land or water area or airspace above the land
or water owned by the grantor appropriate to the retaining or maintaining of such
land, water, airspace, including improvements, predominantly in a natural, scenic, or
open condition, or for wildlife habitat, or for agricultural, horticultural, recreational,
forest, or other use or condition consistent with the protection of open land having
wholesome environmental quality or life-sustaining ecological diversity, or appropriate
to the conservation and preservation of buildings, sites, or structures having historical,
architectural, or cultural interest or value.
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-102 (1982); Connecticut,
'[pireservation restriction' means a limitation, whether or not stated in the form of a
restriction, easement, covenant or condition, in any deed, will or other instrument
executed by or on behalf of the owner of land or in any order of taking of such land
whose purpose is to preserve historically significant structures or sites.
CONN. GEN. STAT. AN. § 47-42a(b) (West 1978); Georgia,
'[flacade easement' means any restriction or limitation on the use of real property
which is expressly recited in any deed or other instrument of grant of conveyance
executed by or on behalf of the owner of real property and whose purpose is to preserve
historically or architecturally significant structures or sites located within an officially
designated historic district pursuant to any local political subdivision's authority to
provide for such districts and to provide for special zoning restrictions therein.
GA. CODE ANN. § 44-10-2(3) (1982); Idaho, "historic easement means any easement restriction,
covenant or condition running with the land, designated to preserve, maintain or enhance all
or part of the existing state of places of historical, architectural, archeological or cultural
significance," IDAHO CODE § 67-4613 (1980); Illinois,
A preservation restriction is a right, whether or not stated in the form of a restriction,
easement, covenant or condition, in any deed, will or other instrument executed by
or on behalf of the owner of the land or in any order of taking, appropriate to the
preservation of areas, places, buildings or structures to forbid or limit acts of
demolition, alteration, use or other acts detrimental to the preservation of the areas,
places, buildings or structures in accordance with the purposes of the Division.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-48.2-1A(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
90. UCEA, supra note 22, at § 1(2). The UCEA provides:'[h]older' means:
(i) a governmental body empowered to hold an interest in real property under the
laws of this State or the United States; or
(ii) a charitable corporation, charitable association, or charitable trust, the purposes
or powers which include retaining or protecting the natural, scenic, or open-
space values of real property, assuring the availability of real property for
agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources,
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several states.91 Some other jurisdictions limit holders to governmental bodies
or public corporations.92
Expansion of qualified holders under the UCEA to include public and
certain private entities is an accommodation between wholesale allowance of
private agreements and concern about abuse in their creation.9 3 For example,
sham transactions are curbed because of definitional limitations on qualified
donees which must be met in order for a donor to take advantage of tax
reductions or other government benefits.9 4 Restrictions on qualified charitable
donees increase the likelihood holders have the expertise necessary to select
maintaining or enhancing air or waterquality, or preserving the historical,
architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.
Id.
91. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 338-30.5-104(2) (1982). For example, Colorado provides "[a]
conservation easement in gross may only be created through a grant to a governmental entity
or to a charitable organization exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the 'Internal Revenue Code
of 1954,' as amended, which organization was created at least two years prior to receipt of the
conservation easement." Id. Connecticut provides "[s]uch conservation and preservation restric-
tions are interests in land and may be acquired by any governmental body or any charitable
corporation or trust which has the power to acquire interests in land in the same manner as it
may acquire other interests in land." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-42(c) (West 1978). The
Delaware statute says that "[s]uch conservation and preservation easements are valuable interests
in a real property and may be acquired by any governmental body or any charitable corporation
or trust which has the power to acquire interests in land in the same manner as it may acquire
other interests in land." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6813 (Supp. 1980). In Florida, "[c]onservation
easements may be acquired by any governmental body or agency or by a charitable corporation
or trust whose purposes include the conservation of land or water areas or the preservation of
buildings or sites of historical or cultural significance." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.06(3) (West
Supp. 1980). Georgia's statute states "[flacade and conservation easements are interests in land
and may be acquired through express grant to any governmental body or charitable or
educational corporation, trust, or organization which has the power to acquire interests in
land." GA. CODE ANN. § 44-10-4 (1982). Massachusetts provides "[s]uch conservation, preser-
vation, and agricultural preservation restrictions are interests in land and may be acquired by
any governmental body or such charitable corporations or trust which have power to acquire
interest in the land, in the same manner as it may acquire other interests in land." MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 184, § 32 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1977). South Carolina says"[s]uch conservation
restrictions are interests in land and may be acquired by any governmental body or the Nature
Conservancy which has power to acquire interests in land, in the same manner as it may acquire
other interests in land." S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-9-20 (Law Co-op 1977).
92. E.g., Alabama, ALA. CODE § 41-10-137 (Supp. 1982) (public corporations known as
historical preservation authorities); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 67-4613 (1980) (any city or county);
Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-48.2-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982) (all municipalities or
administrative agencies thereof); IOWA CODE ANN. § 111 D.1 (West Supp. 1982) (the state
conservation commission, the Iowa natural resources council, any county conservation board,
and any city or agency thereof); Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 65.420 (Baldwin 1979) (local
legislative bodies); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 § 11943 (Purdon Supp. 1982) (counties);
South Dakota; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-19B-13 (1980) (any county or municipal historic
preservation commission); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-15-101, -102(1) (1980) (public
bodies); Texas, TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 181.054 (Vernon Supp. 1982) (Texas Conservation
Foundation); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 20-1-7(11) (1981) (director of department of natural
resources).
93. UCEA, supra note 22 (Commissioners' prefatory note).
94. Id.
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appropriate projects, provide needed guidance and oversee enforcement. 95 If
no requirements existed concerning the identity of the donee, donors would
be free to make unwise selections. The UCEA offers a prudent balance of
competing concerns.
The UCEA's creation requirements are similar to those for other ease-
ments. 96 This feature of the UCEA reflects the attempt to bring these interests
under traditional easement doctrine.97 Acceptance, duration and modification
are important considerations in this regard. One unusual provision, also
mandated in Delaware, 9 is the requirement of recording the acceptance of
the holder. 99 Such a requirement ensures that holders have knowledge of and
agree to conveyance of the easement.1°° This strict procedure is imposed due
to the UCEA's deviation from common law in allowing non-traditional
property interests, and it underscores the mutual agreement aspect of the
easement.
In addition to acceptance, the UCEA addresses duration. The UCEA
provides for unlimited length unless the parties indicate otherwise.10 This is
an area of divergence among the states. Some have used the same method
as the UCEA and presume perpetuity unless stated to the contrary. 0 2 Others
fail to mention duration and, presumably, are governed by applicable state
law. 103 A third format is found in Kentucky'04 and North Carolina 0 5 which
95. T. COUGHLIN, supra note 4, at 6.
96. See UCEA, supra note 22, at § 2(a). The UCEA provides "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this Act, a conservation easement may be created, conveyed, recorded, assigned,
released, modified, terminated, otherwise altered or affected in the same manner as other
easements." Id.
97. Id. (Commissioners' prefatory note).
98. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7 § 6814 (Supp. 1980).
99. See UCEA, supra note 22, at § 2(b). The UCEA says "[n]o right or duty in favor of
or against a holder and no right in favor of a person having a third-party right of enforcement
arises under a conservation easement before its acceptance by the holder and a recordation of
the acceptance." Id.
100. Id. (Commissioners' comment). Explaining the reasoning underlying this provision,
the Commissioners stated the following rationale.
Conservation and preservation organizations using easement programs indicated a
concern that instruments purporting to impose affirmative obligations on the holder
may be unilaterally executed by grantors and recorded without notice to or acceptance
by the holder ostensibly responsible for the performance of the affirmative obligations.
Id.
101. Id. at § 2(c). The UCEA provides "[e]xcept as provided in Section 3(b), [court
modification] a conservation easement is unlimited in duration unless the instrument creating it
otherwise provides." Id.
102. E.g., Colorado, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-103(3) (1982); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 704.06(2) (Supp. 1982); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 44-10-4 (1982); Iowa, IOVA CODE ANN.
§ IID.2 (Supp. 1982).
103. E.g., Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-42(a)-(c) (1978); Idaho, IDAHO CODE
§ 67-4613 (1980); South Dakota, S.D. CODn=D LAWS ANN. § 1-19B-13 (1980).
104. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.410 (Baldwin 1979); id. § 65.462 (term of not less than 30
years); id. § 65.474 (term may be extended subsequent to creation of easement).
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-38(c) (1981) (perpetually or for stipulated shorter periods of
time).
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do not presume perpetuity, so the document must state either perpetuity or
a specified shorter length. In contrast, Montana' °6 provides that duration
must be perpetual or for a renewable term of not less than fifteen years.
Tennessee' 07 allows conveyance of an easement in fee simple '08 or as measured
by the donor's life, the life of another or for a term of years. The UCEA
offers a straightforward and realistic approach by simply presuming perpe-
tuity yet allowing the parties to designate otherwise.
For many years non-possessory property interests have been disfavored
as unduly restrictive of growth and development. To temper this restrictive
potential, flexibility is necessary. While the UCEA makes no separate pro-
vision for alteration of an easement, it does allow this to be accomplished
by the same method applicable to other easements."°9 The usual ways to
extinguish an easement include reunification of title of the dominant and
servient tenements or, in the case of an interest in gross, acquisition of the
servient tenement by the holder of the benefit."10 Release,"' abandonment," 2
and estoppel ' 3 are other legal doctrines which allow termination. An equity
court could consider changed circumstances as a basis to end a conservation
easement.'14
Several jurisdictions" -' employ a format similar to the alteration provision
of the UCEA. In statutes not mentioning alteration, arguably, the same
106. MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (1981).
107. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11-15-102(2)(C)(i)-(iii) (1980). Tennessee also allows cancellation
under limited circumstances. Id. at § 11-15-108.
108. See id. at § 11-15-102(C)(i). Use of the term "fee simple" in Tennessee's statute
concerning the duration of easements is misplaced since an easement is a non-possessory interest
and is but one in the "bundle of sticks" of ownership known as fee simple, a possessory interest
in land. The Tennessee legislature perhaps intended the concept of perpetuity rather than fee
simple.
109. UCEA, supra note 22, at § 2(a). "Except as other wise provided in this Act, a
conservation easement may be ... released, modified, terminated or otherwise altered or
affected in the same manner as other easements." Id. "This Act does not affect the power of
a court to modify or terminate a conservation easement in accordance with the principles of
law and equity." Id. at § 3(b).
110. AzmmaucAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 34, at §§ 8.87-8.94; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 34, at §§ 497, 499.
111. AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 34, at § 8.95; RESTATEMENT, supra note 34,
at §§ 500-503.
112. AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra § 8.96-8.98.
113. Id. at §§ 8.99-8.101.
114. Id. at § 9.39.
115. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-107 (1982). Colorado provides "[c]onservation
easements in gross may, in whole or in part, be released, terminated, extinguished, or abandoned
by merger with the underlying fee interest in the servient land or in any other manner in which
easements may be lawfully terminated, released, extinguished, or abandoned." Id. Delaware
notes conservation and preservation
easements may be released, whole or in part by the holder for such consideration, if
any, as the holder may determine, in the same manner as the holder may dispose of
real property or other interests in real property, subject to such conditions as may
have been imposed at the time of creation of the easement consistent with the
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would be true." 6 Iowa courts specifically recognize the occurrence of changed
circumstances which justify modifications of easements." 7 Allowing general
state doctrine to control alteration of these specialized easements, as the
UCEA does, is important to guard against undue restrictions and also to
provide needed stability.
B. Enforcement
Enforcement is problematic because holders may not compel compliance
as vigorously as the spirit of the easement requires. The UCEA stipulates
four entities which may institute actions to enforce, modify or terminate
easements: the owner of burdened property, an easement holder, a holder
of a third-party right of enforcement specified in the easement, and a person
authorized by other law."" The complexity of a successful program is evident
simply in the selection of four enforcement bodies. Designation of several
possible enforcers is an attempt to anticipate diverse situations which may
occur, especially considering the potentially infinite duration of preservation
easements.
The enforcement portion of the UCEA raises several other issues. The
third-party provision allows establishment of a third-party right of enforce-
ment."19 This is an innovative concept and deserves consideration because
most state statutes simply do not address the enforcement issue. Three
requirements of specific future public uses, including, but not limited to, roads and
utilities, unforeseen when the easement was created.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6813 (Supp. 1980). Florida's statue says "a conservation easement
may be released by the holder of the easement to the holder of the fee even though the holder
of the fee may not be a governmental body or a charitable corporation or trust." FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 704.06(4) (West Supp. 1982). The Georgia statute states
[it shall be presumed that facade or conservation easements are created in perpetuity
unless the instrument of conveyance creating the facade or conservation easement
shall state otherwise, in which case the easement may be extinguished or released in
whole or in part by the dominant owner in the same manner or by the same means
as other easements are extinguished or released.
GA. CODE ANN. § 44-10-4 (1982). Maryland provides "[a] restriction . . . may be extinguished
or released ... in the same manner as other easements." MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-
118(d) (1981).
116. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-42(a)-(c) (West 1978); IDAHO CODE § 67-4613
(1980).
117. See IOWA CODE ANN. § I ID.2 (West 1982). Iowa provides
[a] conservation easement shall be perpetual unless expressly limited to a lesser term,
or unless released by the holder thereof, or unless change of circumstances shall
render such easement no longer beneficial to the public. No comparative economic
test shall be used to determine whether a conservation easement is beneficial to the
public.
Id.
118. UCEA, supra note 22, at §§ 3a(l)-(4).
119. Id. at § l(3).The UCEA provides " '[t]hird party right of enforcement' means a right
provided in a conservation easement to enforce any of its terms granted to a governmental
body, charitable corporation, charitable association, or charitable trust, which, although eligible
to be a holder, is not a holder." Id.
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noteworthy exceptions exist. Kentucky allows enforcement by the local
legislative body, and if it fails to act, then by any citizen of a jurisdiction
which has acquired a scenic easement. 20 Colorado limits enforcement to the
grantor or easement holder.' 2' In North Carolina enforcement is solely the
province of the holder although, by agreement, relief also may be available
to the creator.'2 The UCEA provision reflects a balancing philosophy and
recognizes the intricacies of successful long-term planning.
C. Common Law Impediments
The central concern of the UCEA is common law impediments to
preservation easements. The Commissioners succinctly removed common law
impediments from qualifying non-possessory interests and enumerated those
120. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 65.470 (Baldwin 1979). Kentucky provides
(I) [f]rom and after the time when a scenic easement has been acquired by the
local legislative body and its acceptance endorsed thereon, no building
permit shall be issued for any structure which would violate the easement
and the local legislative body shall seek by appropriate proceedings an
injunction against any threatened construction or other development or
activity on the land which would violate the easement and shall seek a
mandatory injunction requiring the removal of any structure erected in
violation of the easement and the restoration of the land to its original
character insofar as possible.
(2) In the event the local legislative body fails to seek an injunction against any
threatened construction or other development or activity on the land which
would violate the easement or to seek a mandatory injunction requiring the
removal of any structure erected in violation of the easement or the
restoration of the land to its original character insofar as possible, or if the
local legislative body should construct any structure or development or
conduct or permit any activity in violation of the easement, any resident of
the jurisdiction which has acquired the easement may, by appropriate
proceedings, seek such an injunction.
Id.
121. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 38-30.5-108(2), (3) (1982). Colorado provides
(2) [a]ctual or threatened injury to or impairment of a conservation easement
in gross or the interest intended for protection by such easement may be
prohibited or restrained by injunctive relief granted by any court of com-
petent jurisdiction in a proceeding initiated by grantor or by an owner of
the easement.
(3) In addition to the remedy of injunctive relief, the h61der of a conservation
easement in gross shall be entitled to recover money damages for injury
thereto or to the interest to be protected thereby. In assessing such damages,
there may be taken into account, in addition to the cost of restoration and
other usual rules of the law of damages, the loss of scenic, aesthetic, and
environmental values.
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121.39(a) (1981). North Carolina provides
[c]onservation or preservation agreements may be enforced by the holder by injunction
and other appropriate equitable relief administered or afforded by the courts of this
State. Where appropriate under the agreement, damages, or other mandatory relief
may also be awarded either to the holder or creator of the agreement or either of
their successors for breach of any obligations undertaken by either.
[Vol. 43:369
19861 CONSERVING THE NATION'S HERITAGE 393
characteristics which do not affect the validity of an easement drafted to
meet the requirements of the UCEA.
2 3
The traditional requirement that the holder own real property benefited
by the agreement was specifically eliminated. 24 The UCEA provides that an
easement may be affirmative or negative. 12s Regardless, assignment is al-
lowed. 26 The novelty of the purpose is irrelevant.' 27 Where the other require-
ments of the UCEA are met, existence of these aspects does not bar
enforcement.
These are significant factors because a preservation group need not incur
the expense of owning benefited real property in order to hold an agreement
in gross. The interest may be assigned to another qualified organization if
desired. The easement may impose a negative obligation such as restricting
the use made of the property, or affirmative -duties including maintenance
and repair might be required.'
28
The UCEA provides needed uniformity. Its widespread adoption would
facilitate creation of valid non-possessory property rights designed to promote
community interests in conservation and preservation. There are, however,
various additional concerns.
V. Topics UNANSWERED BY THE UCEA
In adopting the format of the UCEA, the Commissioners elected to
include certain provisions and eliminate others. As with all such selections,
separate policy considerations supported the competing alternatives. A num-
ber of topics are not addressed by the UCEA. These matters may be
categorized as concerning creation, enforcement or modification of the
interest. Any jurisdiction considering adoption of the UCEA should consider
the ramifications of the omissions in light of the state's existing law.
A. Creation
Four issues relating to creation of the interest are not covered. The
Commissioners do not include any form of third party approval before the
123. See UCEA, supra note 22, at § 4. A conservation easement is valid even though:
(1) it is not appurtenant to an interest in real property;
(2) it can be or has been assigned to another holder;
(3) it is not of a character that has been recognized traditionally at common law;
(4) it imposes a negative burden;
(5) it imposes affirmative obligations upon the owner of an interest in burdened
property or upon the holder;
(6) the benefit does not touch or concern real property; or
(7) there is no privity of estate or of contract.
Id.
124. Id. at § 4(l).
125. Id. at § 4(4), (5).
126. Id. at § 4(2).
127. Id. at § 4(3).
128. See G. GAMMAGE, P. JONES & S. JONES, HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN CALIFORNIA 33-
34 (1975). It has been suggested that positive easements always should be coupled with negative
easements in order to ensure continued compliance. Id.
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creation of these agreements. 29 Presumably, the creator and the holder are
free to make their own arrangements, consistent with the UCEA. This is not
the case in several states. Kentucky provides for a report to be prepared by
the local planning commission stating whether the proposed scenic easement
is consistent with the comprehensive plan. Preparation of the report is
mandatory, but its comments are merely advisory to the local legislative
body considering acquiring the easement.130 A similar procedure is required
in Montana.' 3' Requiring any form of third party approval was specifically
rejected by the Commissioners as contrary to facilitation of the private
creation of non-possessory interests.112 The advisory nature of the Kentucky
and Montana procedures seems to cut against the undue restriction rationale
put forth by the Commissioners. Consideration of compatibility with the
comprehensive plan is valuable, as is the community input available in a
public hearing. Both of these additions to the UCEA should be reviewed by
a jurisdiction considering adoption.
Other than the requirement of a recorded acceptance by the donee,," no
additional provisions in-the UCEA exist regarding recording of an easement.
Massachusetts' 34 provides for a separate index. Several states'3 require that
these interests be treated as other recordable interests. The Commissioners
left recording requirements to the adopting jurisdiction.'36 Thus, a state
choosing the UCEA must consider whether any modifications to its exiting
recordation system are required or desired. There is a caveat, however. While
separate indexing should make existence of these interests readily ascertain-
able, rampant proliferation of a variety of indices actually may increase the
risk of erroneous title searching because more volumes must be reviewed and
some individual must study each document to determine in which indices it
must be entered.
37
129. UCEA, supra note 22 (Commissioners' prefatory note).
130. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.468 (Baldwin 1979).
131. MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-206 (1981).
132. UCEA, supra note 22 (Commissioners' prefatory note).
133. Id. at § 2(b).
134. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184, § 33 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1977) provides
[any city or town may file with the register of deeds for the county or district in
which it is situated a map or set of maps of the city or town, to be known as the
public restriction tract index, on which may be indexed conservation and preservation
restrictions and restrictions held by any governmental body. Such indexing shall
indicate sufficiently for identification (a) the land subject to the restriction, (b) the
name of the holder of the restriction, and (c) the place of record in the public records
of the instrument imposing the restriction.
135. E.g., Colorado, CoLo. REv. STAT. § 38-30.5-106 (1982); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §
704.06(5) (West Supp. 1982); Iowa, IowA CODE ANN. § 11 ID.3 (West Supp. 1982); Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 84.65 (West Supp. 1982); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-207 (1981).
136. UCEA, supra note 22 (Commissioners' prefatory note).
137. See J. CRIBBET & C. JOHNSON, PROPERTY 1281 (4th ed. 1978). Professors Cribbet and
Johnson note an overall trend toward reduction in the number of indices. Yet, Idaho, for
example, provides for twenty-seven separate indices. IDAHO CODE § 31-2404 (Supp. 1982).
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Adopting states should also consider the impact of the UCEA in light
of the state's marketable title act.3 8 This is a curative provision by which
title certification need only extend back a designated number of years. Under
a marketable title act, a conclusive presumption exists that property is
unencumbered by interests created prior to that time. 3 9 The Commissioners
pointed out a possible conflict between these acts and perpetual duration of
non-possessory interests. Nevertheless, they suggested no resolution.' 40 This
is an instance when a separate index for preservation and conservation
easements would be beneficial because its contents could be exempted from
a marketable title act. A jurisdiction considering passage of the UCEA must
be cognizant of its interplay with extant legislation and must resolve any
inconsistencies.
Consideration of local, state or federal tax policy also was omitted, as
extraneous to the primary concern of the UCEA. '" Economic aspects are
significant and often are motivating forces in the creation of easements.
While a prospective donor should become familiar with applicable tax
provisions before conveyance, the Commissioners astutely separated these
matters from the UCEA. The Act is intended to be an enduring solution to
historical restrictions on non-possessory property interests. On the other
hand, tax policy is quite fluid and continually subjected to modification.
While existing tax policy should be reviewed prior to passage of the UCEA,
tax policy should not be incorporated into the body of the Act.
B. Enforcement
A central problem inherent in non-possessory property interests is en-
forcement. The UCEA specifies four entities which may institute enforcement
actions. 4 2 Other enforcement issues are left to existing state law. 4 3 Several
jurisdictions'" provide a right of entry for inspection, which the UCEA
lacks. Inspection is a reasonable method for monitoring compliance. With
interior easements or exterior easements over vast acreage, inspection may
be the only practical means for determining compliance.
C. Modification
Unanticipated changes are of constant concern. The UCEA leaves mod-
138. E.g., Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 712.01-.10 (1969 & Supp. 1982); Iowa, IowA CODE
ANN. §§ 614.29-.38 (Supp. 1982); Ohio, OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.47-.56 (Page 1981).
139. W. ATrEBERRY, K. PEARSON & M. LrTrA, REAL ESTATE LAW 157 (2d ed. 1978).
140. UCEA, supra note 22 (Commissioners' prefatory note).
141. Id.
142. UCEA, supra note 22, at § 3(a).
143. Id. (Commissioners' comment).
144. E.g., Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6812 (Supp. 1980); Florida, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 704.06(4) (West Supp. 1980); and Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 84.65 subd. 2 (West
Supp. 1982).
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ification and termination to other state law. 45 Maryland 46 and Minnesota 47
provide for alternative holders in the event private donees become disqualified
or otherwise unable to administer easements. Just as a court may apply the
doctrine of cy pres 48 to preserve the intended good of a charitable trust, an
adopting legislature should consider a contingency provision to preserve
easements held by an organization which no longer is able to carry out the
intentions of the private agreement. Such an amendment to the UCEA is a
positive step.
Another possible occurrence involves condemnation of existing ease-
ments. The UCEA does not address this issue. 49 Colorado 50 and Delaware' 5'
provide that preservation easements are not immune from the power of
eminent domain. Specification of the status of preservation easements in a
particular jurisdiction is prudent because it resolves any possible uncertainty.
Although the UCEA quite successfully addressed numerous relevant
matters, other issues would remain unresolved after the UCEA's adoption
by a particular jurisdiction. Careful attention to these additional issues of
creation, enforcement and modification is imperative.
VI. CONCLUSION
The startling growth of the preservation movement should not be mis-
taken for a whimsical fad. It reflects, instead, our collective desire to cling
to important aspects of our past while we rapidly advance toward an
uncertain future. There are important lessons to be learned from antecedent
events. We might reflect on the tragedy of war while visiting a battlefield,
or consider the ramifications of our nation's immigrant character while
passing through a preserved ethnic neighborhood. From encounters such as
these, society gains strength and stability.
145. UCEA, supra note 22, at § 3(a) (Commissioners' comment).
146. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-118(3) (1981) (Maryland Agricultural Land Preser-
vation Foundation, Maryland Historical Trust, or Maryland Environmental Trust).
147. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 84.65 subd. 3 (West Supp. 1982) (conservation restriction vest
in State of Minnesota, to be administered by the commissioner of natural resources).
148. Cy pres is a doctrine of judicial power. The original meaning is "as near as possible."
It allows reformation of administrative or substantive provisions of a charitable trust where
necessary due to altered conditions based on the imputed or inferred intent of the settlor of the
trust. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 147 (5th ed. 1973). By analogy, the legislature
could create a separate power, similar to cy pres, which would be applicable to reformation of
conservation and preservation easements where changed circumstances indicate such a necessity.
149. UCEA, supra note 22 (Commissioners' prefatory note).
150. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-110 (1982) provides "[n]othing in this article shall be
construed so as to impair the rights of a public utility ... with respect to rights-of-way,
easements, or other property rights upon which facilities, plants, or systems of a public utility
are located or are to be located."
151. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6815 (Supp. 1980) provides "[niothing contained in this
subchapter is intended to restrict, restrain or hold in abeyance any agency with powers of
eminent domain in their exercising that power."
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The UCEA is a significant step toward enhancing the preservation
arsenal. It recognizes that preservation of social and cultural resources should
not be compressed into legal concepts indifferent to the rich characteristics
of the preserved past. Given society's limited financial reserves with which
to develop an historic portrait, doctrinal impediments should yield to inno-
vative efficiency.

